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PROTECTING THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING:  
PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MCKENNON RULE 
 
by 
 
Jenny B. Wahl* 
 
 
Suppose an employer accused of discrimination learns during litigation that the 
plaintiff had fabricated a college degree, hidden a prior criminal conviction, or stolen 
confidential documents.  Will evidence of the concealed misconduct shield the employer 
from liability?  Not under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.1  In this 
landmark case, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that such plaintiffs might obtain 
relief even if the “after-acquired” evidence would have led to lawful termination or 
lawful failure to hire if defendants had uncovered it when it occurred.  
  
Most commentators applaud McKennon, complaining only that it does not go far 
enough in combating employer discrimination.  Left unacknowledged, however, are the 
potentially perverse consequences of the ruling.  McKennon dilutes the effectiveness of 
labor-market signaling because it protects the wolf in sheep’s clothing as well as the 
sheep.  The unintended result of this well-intentioned rule may be reduced productivity, 
poorer matches of workers to jobs, higher turnover, and increased costs of hiring and 
assessment.  By rendering signals less reliable, McKennon complicates the employer’s 
task of distinguishing the sheep from the wolves.  Consequently, the ruling may 
increase the incidence of statistical discrimination, particularly in the form of pre-hire 
screening.  At the same time, McKennon erodes the benefits of acquiring human capital 
and marketable skills to people with statutorily protected traits.  In sum, despite its 
praiseworthy objectives, McKennon may well worsen labor-market conditions for 
minorities and others covered by discrimination laws. 
 
What follows is, first, a description of the typical scenarios that arise in 
after-acquired-evidence cases and the law surrounding McKennon.  Section II 
discusses how the economic literature on information and signaling applies to such 
cases; section III elaborates upon the motives behind and the perversities of McKennon; 
and section IV offers conclusions. 
 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Economics, Carleton College, Northfield, MN.  A.B., summa cum 
laude, Indiana University; M.A., University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Chicago.  The 
author thanks Ned Wahl, Mike Hemesath, and Mark Ramseyer for their comments. 
1  513 U.S. 352 (1995).  The Court had granted a writ of certiorari in a related Sixth Circuit 
case, which was settled before the decision.  See Milligan-Jensen v. Mich. Tech. Univ., 975 
F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 509 U.S. 943 (1993), cert. dismissed, 509 U.S. 943 (1993). 
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I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Anatomy of an After-Acquired-Evidence Lawsuit: Case Law 
Leading up to McKennon 
 
In the typical after-acquired-evidence case, the plaintiff complains of discriminatory 
treatment by a former, current, or prospective employer.2  The employer offers an 
initial defense, claiming to have fired, disciplined, or rebuffed the plaintiff for legitimate 
reasons.  During discovery, however, the employer finds evidence of job misconduct or 
résumé fraud that would have resulted in dismissal or refusal to hire had the defendant 
known earlier of the bad acts.  Résumé fraud typically consists of misrepresentation of 
educational or work experience qualifications, concealment of misconduct in a previous 
job, or failure to report previous criminal convictions.3 
                                                 
2  Most federal claims have been brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and Supp. V), or the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,  29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 and Supp. V).  
Future federal claims will likely also involve the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Plaintiffs 
have also filed assorted state claims -- for example, under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil 
Rights Act.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2201-11 (West 1999). 
3  According to various sources, résumé fraud seems rampant in the U.S.  Thorndike 
Deland Associates conducted a survey of human resource managers in 1992.  See False 
Credentials, HRMAGAZINE, July 1992, at 20, 22.  These managers observed that falsifying 
credentials was commonplace, particularly in the areas of job performance, compensation 
history, and personality traits.  Id. at 20, 22.  Vericon Resources reported that 80 percent of job 
applications contain lies of some sort, particularly about education.  Sherryl D. Wade, 
Vericon Plays ‘To Tell the Truth’ with Résumés, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON., Dec 16, 1991, at 26A. 
 One international recruiter found “that more than 30 percent of job seekers lie on their 
résumés, not including lies-of-omission.”  Robert Half, Managing Your Career, MGMT. 
ACCT ., May 1989, at 15.  A 1988 study found that almost 1/3 of résumés misstated dates of 
employment by 3 months or more.  Moreover, “11 [percent] of job applicants lied about why 
they had left previous jobs, 4 [percent] fudged job titles, 3 [percent] listed fake emp loyers, 3 
[percent] fabricated jobs, and 3 [percent] pretended to have a college degree.”  Joan E. 
Rigdon, Deceptive Résumés Can Be Door-Openers But Can Become An Employee’s 
Undoing, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992, at B1; see also  Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of 
Predischarge Misconduct Discovered After an Employees’ [sic] Termination as a Defense in 
Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1990) (noting that employers find that 
10 percent of job applicants lie, mostly about their criminal records and medical history); 
David D. Kadue & William J. Dritsas, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employee 
Misconduct and Résumé Fraud Cases, 44 LAB. L. J. 531, 532 n.5 (1993) (offering anecdotal 
evidence that 10 to 20 percent of plaintiffs make significant misstatements or omissions on 
their job applications).  Kadue and Dritsas also cited a study which indicates that up to “33 
percent of 15- to 30-year-olds are willing to lie on a résumé.”  Id. at n.5. (citing Dale R. Crider, 
Resume Fraud Complicates Firing Claims, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 17).  See also  
Rosemary Alito, Résumé Frauds May Forego Right to Sue, N.J. L.J., April 27, 1992, at S6 
2
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1.  Cases that Ordered Summary Judgment for the Employer 
 
Before McKennon, many courts agreed that, if after-acquired evidence would have 
caused the plaintiff to be fired (or never hired initially), the employer defendant was 
entitled to summary judgment.  Judges in these cases largely decided that the plaintiff, 
by virtue of his or her misrepresentations, simply had no legal standing to pursue a 
discrimination claim.  The leading case of Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co. came from the Tenth Circuit.4  The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, most district courts, 
and many state courts followed Summers.5   
 
a.  Job Misconduct.   
 
In Summers, plaintiff V. Ray Summers, a 56-year-old Mormon, claimed he was fired 
from his job as an insurance field-claims representative because of his age and religious 
affiliation.  State Farm, on the other hand, cited Summers’s unsatisfactory job 
performance, poor attitude, and inability to get along with fellow employees and 
customers as reasons for the discharge.  Although the company knew of nine instances 
in which Summers had doctored records, forged a signature, or possibly submitted fake 
receipts, State Farm conceded that it had not fired the plaintiff for these acts.  For these 
offenses, the company had put Summers on probation for two weeks without pay and 
warned him to stop his improper conduct.  After Summers brought suit, his former 
employer found that Summers had actually falsified more than 150 records, 18 of them 
after the probationary period.  Summers did not deny doing so. The court of appeals 
affirmed the district court’s granting of State Farm’s motion for summary judgment in 
                                                                                                                         
(citing another study that claims that 75 percent of employee applications contain false 
information).  In a bizarre recent incident, the owners of a shell company established in St. 
Paul revealed that they were not sure of anything on their CEO’s résumé, including his name.  
Mike Hughlett, Tangled Tale of Equisure Strewn with Allegations, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, 
Sept. 4, 1997, at 1E.  
4  864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
5  For more detailed discussions of state court verdicts, see Claudia D. Orr, The Defense of 
Résumé Fraud and Other “After-Acquired Evidence” of Misconduct under Sixth Circuit and 
Michigan Case Law, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 657 (1993); Alito, supra  note 3, at 1342.  For 
useful studies of federal cases, see Kadue & Dritsas, supra  note 3; Kenneth G. Parker, Note, 
After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases:  A State of Disarray, 72 TEX. 
L. REV. 403 (1993).  See also  Barbara Ryniker Evans & Robert E. McKnight, Jr., Splitting the 
Baby on After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 241 (1995) (providing a good general survey); Robert F. Thompson III, Note, 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.: The Masquerading Doctor, the “Greatest 
Treason,” and After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Suits, 49 ARK. L. 
REV. 625 (1996). 
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this job-misconduct case.6 
 
b. Résumé Fraud: Job Qualifications.   
 
The Tenth Circuit and district courts within it also granted summary judgment in 
cases involving fraudulent reporting of job qualifications.  In Bonger v. American Water 
Works, for example, Rosie Bonger had worked as a human resources director for a 
water company.7  The interviewer who had screened candidates for Bonger’s position 
had rejected all applicants who did not have college degrees and a minimum number of 
years of experience in the human resources field.  Bonger was fired, allegedly for poor 
performance.  She claimed instead that her discharge was motivated by her sex and 
national origin. (Bonger was Hispanic.)  While the action was pending, the company 
learned that Bonger did not have a college degree and had taken nearly three thousand 
pages of confidential personnel files and given them to her attorney just before being 
fired.  The company successfully established that it would have legitimately terminated 
Bonger for résumé fraud or job misconduct, no matter what. 
 
The principal case concerning job qualifications, however, is from the Sixth Circuit: 
 Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.8  Mildred Johnson, a black female 
                                                 
6  Another job misconduct suit that resulted in summary judgment for the employer is 
O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992).  Summers 
tried to use two Ninth Circuit cases to support his position.  In Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 
1416 (9th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff was denied employment as a letter sorter.  The Postal Service 
prevailed in the district court.  The plaintiff appealed, saying that the district court should 
have admitted evidence that the Postal Service did not know of the plaintiff’s epilepsy at the 
time it rejected her for a job, but discovered her handicap afterward.  The plaintiff’s strategy 
backfired: the appellate court determined that this evidence would not have been admissible 
to enlarge the defendant’s basis of rejection, but was admissible to rebut the applicant’s claim 
that she was physically qualified for the job.  In Nanty v. Barrow Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 
1981), the plaintiff (an American Indian) was rejected for a job as a truck driver.  Three days 
later, two Caucasians were hired on the basis of superior qualifications.  The district court 
found that the plaintiff was not qualified and gave judgment to the defendant.  The appellate 
court reversed, however, saying that superior qualifications are not relevant in determining 
whether discrimination existed.  Yet such evidence, according to the court, is relevant to the 
question of whether Nanty would have been hired absent discrimination.  This court 
essentially advocated an additional determination of whether the plaintiff had a right to the 
job or monetary relief.  Despite Summers’s pleas, the Tenth Circuit court decided that the 
cases instead buttressed the defendant’s arguments. 
7  789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992). 
8  955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).  For other cases that advocated summary judgment on the 
basis of misrepresented job qualifications, see Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 
(D.C. Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); O’Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 
(D. Utah 1990), aff’d, 12 F.3d 176 (10th. Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 1141 (1995); Grzenia v. 
Interspec, Inc., No. 91-C290, 1991 WL 222105 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21 1991); Agbor v. Mountain Fuel 
4
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employed as a field-relations manager, initially brought suit in state court alleging 
breach-of-contract violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.  The case 
was later removed to federal district court.  Honeywell maintained that the company had 
fired Johnson for refusing to improve her availability, flexibility, knowledge, and 
willingness to follow directions.  During the discovery period, Honeywell found that 
Johnson had falsely claimed on her job application that she had a college degree and 
significant work experience. (Johnson had replied to a newspaper advertisement that 
specified these attributes as necessary qualifications for the position.)  Honeywell stated 
that it would not have scheduled Johnson for an interview, much less hired her, if the 
company had known of the fabrications.  The appellate court agreed, further 
concluding that Honeywell had adequate and just cause to dismiss Johnson.  
Consequently, it decided that Johnson was not entitled to relief, affirming the district 
court’s directed verdict for Honeywell on the Elliott-Larsen claim and reversing the 
denial of Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment on a wrongful discharge claim. 
 
c. Résumé Fraud:  Misconduct in Previous Jobs.   
 
The Sixth Circuit also granted employers summary judgment in cases where 
plaintiffs had failed to reveal pertinent information about misconduct in previous jobs.  
In Dotson v. U.S. Postal Service, for example, the plaintiff was terminated as a 
part-time letter carrier due to a physical condition that limited his ability to carry mail.9  
After Dotson initiated an action claiming disability discrimination, the defendant 
discovered that Dotson had omitted prior health and employment information on his job 
application - including the fact that he was dismissed from previous jobs at a state 
prison and an A&P warehouse.  The defendant successfully established that Dotson’s 
untruthfulness would have precluded his being hired initially. 
 
d. Résumé Fraud:  Prior Criminal Convictions.   
                                                                                                                         
Supply Co., 810 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Utah 1993); Rich v. Westland Printers, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 379 (D. Md. 1993); Bray v. Forest Pharm., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Ohio 1993).  
See also  Carroll v. City of Chicago, No. 87-C8995, 1990 WL 37631 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 1990); 
Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
9  977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 892 (1992).  For other cases that 
advocated summary judgment for employers when plaintiffs had failed to reveal misconduct 
in previous jobs, see Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Freeman v. Kansas State Network, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 995 (D. Kan. 
1989); Carroll v. Chicago, 1990 WL 37631 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Churchman v. Pinkerton’s Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. 
Kan. 1991); Kravit v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); 
George v. Meyers, No. CIV. A.91-2308-O, 1992 WL 97788 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 1992); Greene v. 
Standard Register Co., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1151 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Rich v. 
Westland Printers, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 379 (D. Md. 1993); Welch v. Liberty Mach. 
Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994). 
5
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Sixth-Circuit defendants received summary judgment as well when plaintiffs had 
neglected to report previous criminal convictions.  In Milligan-Jensen v. Mich. Tech. 
Univ., for instance, the plaintiff indicated on her job application for the position of 
Public Safety Officer that she had never been convicted of an offense more serious 
than a minor traffic violation.10  She also signed a statement acknowledging that 
misrepresentation of facts was grounds for dismissal regardless of when discovered by 
her employer.  After the plaintiff sued for age and sex discrimination, the defendant 
found that she had in fact omitted a prior conviction for driving under the influence of 
alcohol.  The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment for her and ordered 
the district court to enter judgment for her former employer. 
 
Employers received summary judgment in similar cases brought in the courts for the 
Eastern District of Michigan and the District of Kansas.11  In the Michigan case, a black 
male named Foster Benson worked as a manual laborer for Quanex Corporation for 
three months.  He resigned, saying he was taking another job.  In fact, Benson went to 
a drug rehabilitation center.  Afterwards, he reapplied to Quanex, which refused to 
re-hire him.  Benson then complained that he had been racially harassed at work and 
that his voluntary resignation amounted to a constructive discharge.  During discovery, 
Quanex found that Benson had lied about his employment history and misrepresented 
his criminal record.  Instead of working at General Motors, as he had claimed on his job 
application, Benson was at the time incarcerated for robbery.  Moreover, Benson had 
acknowledged in writing that he understood that falsification of information on the 
application would be grounds for discharge.  In the Kansas case, the plaintiff sued her 
former employer for alleged racial and sexual harassment.  During discovery, the 
employer found that she had not revealed a felony conviction for fraud committed on a 
state agency and three terminations for cause by former employers. 
 
2.  Cases that Departed from Summary Judgment for the Employer 
 
Although many pre-McKennon courts embraced a rule of summary judgment for 
employers in after-acquired-evidence cases, others emphatically rejected it.  Why?  
Because it highlighted the undeserving plaintiff rather than the potentially unsavory 
defendant.  In at least some cases, the defendant arguably had fired (or had not hired) 
the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s race, age, gender, or other immutable 
characteristic - in other words, doing what discrimination statutes sought to prevent.   
Courts opposed to summary judgment therefore focused on remedies.12  The two 
                                                 
10  975 F.2d. 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 509 U.S. 903 (1993), cert. dismissed, 509 U.S. 
943 (1993). 
11  Benson v. Quanex Corp. Mich. Seamless Tube Div., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743 
(E.D. Mich. 1992); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989).   
12  Some courts considered assigning liability to employers but no damages.  
6
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leading cases came from the Eleventh and Third Circuits.  The Seventh Circuit also 
eventually repudiated a summary-judgment rule.    
 
a. Résumé Fraud:  Prior Criminal Convictions.   
 
The Eleventh Circuit made its position clear in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.13  
In this case, a female construction-crew flagperson named Joyce Neil alleged 
inadequate compensation, sexual harassment, and retaliatory discharge.  In depositions, 
the employer learned that Neil had lied on her job application about a prior conviction 
for possession of cocaine and marijuana.  The court refused to grant summary 
judgment to Dunn, strongly disagreeing with the reasoning in Summers.  The Wallace 
court said that the Summers ruling improperly ignored the lapse of time between 
Summers’s discharge and the discovery of the misconduct that would have 
legitimatized Summers’s termination.  According to the court, Summers also 
undermined Title VII of the Civil Rights Act:  Summers invited employers to avoid 
liability by rummaging through an employee’s background for flaws instead of acting to 
eliminate discrimination. The court went so far as to envision this implausible scenario: 
 
Summers encourages an employer with a proclivity for unlawful motives to hire a woman -- 
despite knowledge of a legitimate reason that would normally cause the employer not to 
employ her -- to destroy any evidence of such knowledge, to pay her less on the basis of her 
gender, to sexually harass her until she protests, to discharge her, and to “discover” the 
legitimate motive during the ensuing litigation, thus escaping any liability for the unlawful 
treatment of the erstwhile employee.14   
 
The majority opinion in Wallace therefore suggested that courts should limit 
damages in after-acquired-evidence cases rather than eliminating employer liability.  It 
determined that reinstatement or front-pay relief was inappropriate in a Summers setting. 
 The court also conceded that limiting back pay awards and fees made sense if the 
employer proved it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence apart from the 
lawsuit.  Judge Godbold dissented, however, asserting that the court should dismiss the 
suit.  He argued that the plaintiff would not have been hired if she had not lied on her 
application; she therefore had no standing to sue.  Judge Godbold also pointed out that 
the employer was at risk of suits for harm to the public on the grounds of respondeat 
superior or negligent hiring. 
 
                                                                                                                         
Understandably, employers preferred the “no liability” rule promulgated by Summers to a “no 
damages” rule, in part because the latter might affect the company’s standing with its 
insurance carrier or the EEOC whereas the former would not. 
13  968 F.2d 1174 (1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995). 
14  968 F.2d at 1180-81. 
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b. Résumé Fraud: Job Qualifications.   
 
The Third Circuit court refused to grant an employer summary judgment in Mardell 
v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co.15  Here, the plaintiff claimed she was a victim of age 
and sex discrimination.  Her employer fired her for allegedly poor job performance.  
During discovery, the employer learned that Mardell had lied on her résumé, saying 
falsely that she had a college degree and substantial relevant work experience.  
Following Summers, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.  
But the Third Circuit, like the Eleventh, decided to break ranks with other courts and 
held that after-acquired evidence could not be used to determine an employer’s liability 
for discrimination.  This court explicitly shifted the emphasis from the plaintiff’s 
standing to sue under discrimination statutes to the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory 
actions.  As in Wallace, the Mardell court decided that remedies rather than liability 
should be the center of attention.  Specifically, it suggested that damages should accrue 
until the date of judgment.16 
 
c. Résumé Fraud:  Prior Criminal Convictions Redux.  
 
The Seventh Circuit wrestled with the question of summary judgment in 
after-acquired-evidence cases.  It adopted the rule, with modifications, in the 1992 case 
of Washington v. Lake County, Ill.  Here, a former jailer named Eddie Washington 
alleged that his termination was racially motivated.17  According to his employer, 
Washington was fired because of his arrest for criminal sexual assault. (These charges 
were later dropped.)  At the time of Washington’s discharge, his employer did not 
know that the man had falsely reported a clean criminal record on his job application.  
                                                 
15  31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated in part, 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995). For other cases 
that did not grant summary judgment in cases of misrepresented qualifications or unreported 
misconduct in current or previous jobs, see Boyd v. Rubbermaid Commercial Products, Inc., 
62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1228 (W.D. Va. 1992); Rupley v. Rorer Pharm. Corp., No. 90-
C5597, 1992 WL 37121 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90-C7146, 1992 WL 
211074 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1992); Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995); 
Massey v. Trump’s Castle Hotel & Casino, 838 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993); Moodie v. Federal 
Reserve Bank, 831 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Cooper v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 64 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also  Smith v. General Scanning Inc., 876 F.2d 
1315 (7th Cir. 1989) (in dicta).  In the case of Baab v. AMR Service Corp ., 811 F. Supp. 1246 
(N.D. Ohio 1993), the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no legal damage because 
her employer proved that it would have discharged her had it known of her falsified medical 
and employment history. But this court also determined that the after-acquired-evidence 
doctrine established in Summers did not bar the claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  
16  This court later had to comply with the McKennon rule, awarding damages only up to 
the date of discovery.  Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995). 
17  969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992). 
8
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In fact, Washington had pled guilty to criminal trespass in 1974 and was convicted of 
third-degree assault in 1981, although he served no jail time.  Understandably, his 
employer (the Lake County Sheriff’s Department) never would have hired Washington - 
or would have fired him immediately - had it known the truth.  The trial court granted 
summary judgment to his employer.  In order to affirm, the appellate court held the 
following:  an employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, acting in a 
non-discriminatory manner, it would have discharged the employee upon learning of the 
misrepresentation.  The sheriff’s department could not prove that it always fired lying 
employees, in part because it unearthed no evidence of other employees who had lied.  
But the court decided that, given the nature of the plaintiff’s crimes, the burden shifted 
to Washington to produce affirmative evidence that he would not have been fired if 
treated in a race-neutral fashion.  Washington could not do so.  As a result, the 
defendant met the standard set by the court and won summary judgment.   
 
Note, however, the subtlety of the Seventh-Circuit approach.  In a case decided the 
same year as Washington, the plaintiff had denied any felony convictions on his job 
application.  In fact, he had earlier been convicted of armed robbery.  Although the 
employer might have fired the employee upon learning of the conviction, the court 
found no proof that it would have done so.  Unlike in Washington’s case, the court 
refused to bar this plaintiff’s Title VII suit.18 
 
d. Résumé Fraud:  Job Qualifications Redux.   
  
The Seventh Circuit solidified its stance in the 1993 case of Kristufek v. Hussmann 
FoodService Co.19  Here, plaintiff Arthur Kristufek argued that he had been fired 
because of his age and because he had opposed terminating an older secretary.  
Kristufek’s employer maintained that the man was let go because of a corporate 
reorganization.  During discovery, the defendant found that Kristufek had falsely 
claimed to have earned a bachelor’s degree and completed graduate coursework.  The 
district court barred Kristufek from any recovery of damages, entering a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. But the appellate court remanded the case, saying that 
Kristufek’s lies did not preclude his recovery for retaliatory discharge.  The court 
advised, however, that Kristufek’s back pay award and attorneys’ fees should be 
reduced to reflect the time at which the company discovered Kristufek’s lies.  
  
B.  The McKennon Case 
 
Like the Summers case, McKennon dealt with misconduct discovered after an 
                                                 
18  Reed v. AMAX Coal Co ., 971 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992) (dismis sed by the court on other 
grounds).   
19  985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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employee was fired.  Christine McKennon alleged that she lost her secretarial job 
because of her age; she filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).  Her employer, The Nashville Banner, contended that it dismissed her as part 
of a staff cutback.  In conducting discovery, the newspaper’s lawyers found that 
McKennon had taken home several confidential documents in violation of company 
policy.  If the Banner had discovered her action, it would have fired her, as McKennon 
herself acknowledged.  As in various earlier Sixth-Circuit cases and as in Summers, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit viewed the after-acquired evidence as a complete 
bar to relief.20 
 
The Supreme Court saw otherwise.  In a unanimous opinion, the court refused to 
adopt a “no-relief” rule.  Instead, successful plaintiffs in cases like McKennon can 
recover back pay from the time of discriminatory discharge to the date after-acquired 
evidence comes to light - the remedy proposed in Kristufek.  The Court suggested that 
reinstatement and front pay typically are inappropriate, provided employers can establish 
that after-acquired evidence would in fact have led to termination.  But the Court did 
leave open the possibility of additional remedies under “extraordinary equitable 
circumstances.”21 
 
The Court pointed to the purpose of the ADEA in formulating its opinion.  Along 
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, the 
ADEA is intended to wipe out workplace discrimination.  The award of back pay, 
according to the Court, is one means of restoring people to the position they would 
have occupied absent the discrimination.   
 
The McKennon court also addressed the “flyspecking” issue raised in Wallace.  
Specifically, it noted that a defendant’s potential liability for a prevailing plaintiff’s 
attorneys’ fees, as well as sanctions imposed under Rule 11, should discourage 
                                                 
20  McKennon claimed she took the documents because she feared for her job security.  
She argued that her case differed from Summers because her action directly related to the 
discrimination she was about to suffer.  The appellate court dryly noted that adopting 
McKennon’s “nexus” argument would require applying it in cases where the plaintiff stole 
money from his employer in anticipation of a wrongful discharge.  McKennon v. Nashville 
Banner Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 539, 543 n.8 (6th Cir. 1993). 
21  Before McKennon, virtually all courts had concluded that, if the plaintiff’s behavior 
warranted a discharge, reinstatement and front pay were unsuitable remedies.  Disallowing 
equitable remedies rests on the argument that the plaintiff has “unclean hands” and therefore 
is not entitled to equitable relief.  But the Supreme Court has previously rejected this 
argument in public policy cases and therefore included the “extraordinary” language in 
McKennon.  See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp ., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), 
rev’d, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).  
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pointless, time-consuming, or abusive discovery.22 
 
C.  Beyond McKennon:  Recent Commentaries, Guidelines, and Cases 
 
Most commentators suggest that the McKennon court should have favored the 
plaintiff even more than it did.  Many scholars and judges point out that the defendant 
knew about the misconduct only because the plaintiff brought a discrimination suit after 
losing her job.  They argue that, in some cases, a non-discriminating employer might 
never have fired the plaintiff.  Consequently, a remedy that focuses on the date of 
finding evidence may fail to place the plaintiff where he or she would have been without 
the discrimination. After-acquired evidence should influence remedies only if a 
defendant would have discovered the information without a lawsuit, according to these 
critics.23  
 
Others suggest alternative plaintiff-friendly remedies.  One writer contends that front 
pay is appropriate in cases like McKennon, where the plaintiff’s misconduct supposedly 
would not have occurred but for employer discrimination.  Another suggests 
reinstatement as a typical remedy because it would send a stronger message to 
discriminatory supervisors, who do not typically bear the financial burden of damage 
payments but would have to confront a reinstated worker on a daily basis.24 
                                                 
22  This reinforces standards set in Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 
991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989) and Churchman v. Pinkerton’s Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 520 (D. Kan. 
1991). 
23  For example, see Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., 31 F. 3d 1221 (3rd Cir. 1994), 
and Judge Morris Arnold’s dissent in Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F. 3d 1403 
(8th Cir. 1994).  See also  Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).  At least two 
commentators have suggested barring after-acquired evidence unless the employer could 
have discovered it in the ordinary course of business.  Michelle M. Whitney, Note, The 
After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine and its Effect on Recovery in Employment Discrimination 
Claims, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 663 (1996); Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence:  
Tonic for an Employer’s Cognitive Dissonance, 60 MO. L. REV. 89 (1995).  Texas and 
Montana courts actually have barred after-acquired evidence in some circumstances.  See 
Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc., No. H-91-3586, 1992 WL 548195 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 28, 1992); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986). 
24  Andrea Calvaruso, Two Wrongs Don’t Make A Right:  The Supreme Court Strikes 
Down the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1321 (1996); Leona Green, 
Mixed Motives and After-Acquired Evidence:  Second Cousins Benefit from 20/20 
Hindsight, 49 ARK. L. REV. 211 (1996).  Others who support McKennon or suggest extending 
it include Robert J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment 
Discrimination Cases:  Should the Guilty Employer Go Free?, 9 LAB. LAW. 43 (1993); Elissa 
J. Preheim, Note, Discrimination, Deceit, and Legal Decoys: The Diversion of After-Acquired 
Evidence and the Focus Restored by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Company, 
71 IND. L. J. 235 (1995); Lisa R. Petersen, Note, A Final Resolution of the Dispute 
Surrounding After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense to Employment Discrimination, 1995 
11
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The EEOC guidelines issued in December 1995 elaborate upon the issue of employer 
behavior after a plaintiff has filed a lawsuit.25  Under the guidelines, employers who 
seek evidence of past wrongdoing may be guilty of retaliation against the worker.  
Accordingly, if employers who are sued for discrimination try to obtain evidence of 
previous worker fraud or misconduct, they may face EEOC sanctions as well as 
court-imposed penalties for abusive discovery.   
 
A host of after-acquired-evidence cases have arisen since McKennon.  In most, the 
courts have suggested that plaintiffs are entitled at least to back pay.  The following 
paragraphs sketch out major post-McKennon developments. 
 
Job misconduct cases thus far primarily have involved misappropriation of 
documents or unproductive behavior.  In Castle v. Rubin,26 plaintiff Castle was fired 
for poor performance during her probationary period at the U.S. Treasury.  She sued, 
claiming to be a victim of sex discrimination.  Although the defendant later discovered 
that Castle had plagiarized extensively instead of writing original training materials, the 
court felt bound by McKennon to award back pay.  The court did not, however, adopt 
the plaintiff’s argument that she was entitled to far more compensation because she 
would have been tenured by the time the defendant found the evidence of plagiarism.  
In Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl,27 the New York plaintiff was a female 
                                                                                                                         
UTAH L. REV. 943 (1995); Pamela M. Martey, Note, “The Last Temptation is the Greatest 
Treason:  To Do the Right Deed for the Wrong Reason”:  After-Acquired Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Claims: McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 28 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1031 (1995); Carolyn L. Whitford, Note, While the United States Supreme 
Court Waves Goodbye to the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, It May Allow the Employer 
to Hold a Card Up Its Sleeve in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 74 NEB. L. 
REV. 374 (1995); Tricia Lynne Landthorn, Comment, Two Wrongs Can Make A Right: 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. and the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 56 
OHIO ST. L. J. 1019 (1995); Tory E. Griffin, Note, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing 
Co.: The Future Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 
74 OR. L. REV. 781 (1995); Thompson, supra  note 5; Martin Adler, Nailing down the Coffin 
Lid: the Rise and Fall of the After-acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Litigation, 39 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719 (1994); Sharona Hoffman, The After-Acquired Evidence Rule: The Best 
of All Possible Worlds?  22 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 79 (1996); Sheldon J. Stark & Margaret J. 
Sande, Here’s the Dirt on ‘After-Acquired’ Evidence Since McKennon, TRIAL, Sept. 1997, at 
28. 
25  EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (December 14, 1995), in UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EMPLOYER EEO RESPONSIBILITIES : PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION IN 
THE WORKPLACE, THE LAW AND EEOC PROCEDURES (Technical Assistance Program, Apr. 
1996). 
26  78 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
27  901 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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lawyer fired after returning from maternity leave.  She claimed sex discrimination and 
poor treatment by her colleagues; the defendants pointed out the radical decrease in 
hours billed by Sigmon and legitimate needs for reductions in force.  During discovery, 
the defendants found that Sigmon had taken and copied several confidential documents 
located in the room allotted to her for her job search.  In the Iowa dispute of Walters v. 
U.S. Gypsum,28 a forklift operator was fired, allegedly for poor performance, 
absenteeism, and abuse of coworkers.  She claimed disability discrimination.  The 
defendant later found that Walters frequently had come to work under the influence of 
beer or marijuana. 
 
Cases of résumé fraud after McKennon have yielded false reports of college degrees 
or work experience, obscuring of criminal records, failure to report firings from 
previous jobs, and misleading health information.  For example, in Petrovich v. LPI 
Service Corp.,29  the plaintiff claimed that his employer fired him because he was 
Serbian, not because he couldn’t do his job.  The defendant later found that Petrovich 
had omitted references to previous jobs and falsified his credentials and experience.  
Petrovich then claimed that someone else had prepared his résumé so he should not be 
held responsible for errors within it.  Although the court did not adopt Petrovich’s 
argument -- apparently because the man had had time to read his prepared résumé -- it 
left the door open for remedies in addition to back pay.  In the Fifth Circuit case of 
Patterson v. PHP Healthcare Corp.,30 the plaintiff allegedly was fired for 
insubordination, tardiness, and inability to work constructively with others.  He filed a 
race discrimination charge against his employer, who subsequently discovered that 
Brown had been earlier convicted of burglary (although his record was later expunged). 
 A Michigan plaintiff in Wright v. Restaurant Concept Management, Inc.31 also claimed 
race discrimination after he was fired for insubordination from his position as a 
restaurant manager.  The defendant later found that Wright had earlier been convicted 
for felonious assault after engaging in a six-hour standoff with police.  In the Kentucky 
dispute of Toyota Mfg. Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Epperson,32 the Toyota company discharged 
a probationary employee under established company policy when he did not return from 
disability leave after six months.  He claimed disability discrimination.  Toyota then 
discovered that Epperson had neglected to disclose his termination from previous jobs 
and his substantial medical problems.  Although the court awarded damages, one judge 
wrote a furious dissent, arguing that damages in this case constituted a reward for 
gross fraud. 
 
One interesting issue that has arisen is this:  should the McKennon standard apply in 
ordinary breach-of-contract cases as well as in discrimination cases?  Some courts 
                                                 
28  537 N.W. 2d 708 (Iowa 1995). 
29  949 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
30  90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996). 
31  532 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
32  945 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1996). 
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seem inclined to say “yes.”33  A few have said “no”.  For example, in Crawford 
Rehabilitation Services v. Weissman,34 the plaintiff protested her termination after she 
took an unauthorized day off.  In fact, her employer had explicitly denied permission for 
the holiday.  Her employer later discovered that Weissman had failed to report a 
previous termination for cause and had lied about her job experience.  The court 
decided that McKennon did not entitle this plaintiff to any damages.  In the South 
Carolina case of Lewis v. Fisher Service Co.,35 the plaintiff was fired when he made 
secret tape recordings of conversations with his supervisor, then replayed them for 
co-workers.  He protested, saying that the company handbook provided for progressive 
discipline except in cases of very serious offenses.  The defendant later found that 
Lewis had engaged in similar tape-recordings in previous jobs.  The court suggested 
that the after-acquired evidence, coupled with the “serious-offense” clause in the 
handbook, should permit the employer to avoid all liability. 
 
II.  AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF AFTER-ACQUIRED-EVIDENCE CASES 
 
A.  Economic Models of Statistical Discrimination and Signaling 
 
Most economists are reluctant to use pure discrimination as the leading explanation 
for differences in job-market experiences between blacks and whites, women and men, 
and the like.  Pure discrimination -- the unequal treatment by employers of equally 
productive people -- is costly.  Gary Becker’s seminal work demonstrates that, in a 
competitive market, discriminating employers would lose money and go out of 
business.36 
 
Yet job-market differences persist, so economists have turned to alternative 
explanations to account for them.  Edmund Phelps, Dennis Aigner, and Glen Cain 
pioneered the notion of using statistical discrimination as a way to explain wage 
differentials.37  Their models presume that employers can observe the quality of job 
                                                 
33  S. Med. Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 1995); see also  Gassman v. 
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 921 P.2d 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 933 
P.2d 743 (Kan. 1997). 
34  938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997). 
35  495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998). 
36  GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2nd ed. 1971); see also STUDIES IN 
LABOR MARKETS (Sherwin Rosen ed. 1981); IMPLICIT CONTRACT THEORY (Sherwin Rosen ed. 
1994); ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (Emily P. Hoffman ed. 1991).  But see 
Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Discrimination:  Empirical Evidence from the 
United States, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 316 (1987).  Blau and Ferber offer data showing that blacks 
and women are paid lower wages and encounter higher unemployment than otherwise 
comparable white males.  Id. at 319. 
37  Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,  62 AM. ECON. REV. 
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applicants via some testing mechanism.  Test scores yield only imperfect information 
about quality, however, so employers may base wage offers on other observable 
information such as skin color or sex.  If employers are risk-averse and test scores are 
less reliable for, say, blacks and women, then white males may receive better offers.38  
This effect is exacerbated if employers believe that blacks and women are less 
productive on average, perhaps because of pre-labor-market discrimination in schooling 
or housing. 
 
In these sorts of models, employers have incentives to design superior tests in order 
to increase profits.  An employer who develops a better test could hire blacks and 
females at a wage higher than they could make elsewhere, but lower than the 
white-male wage.  At the same time, blacks and women have incentives to acquire 
qualifications like better education or good references that send signals to employers.  
These signals permit employers to get past imperfect test results, skin color, and sex.39 
 Clear signals of individual productivity lessen employer reliance on flawed testing 
mechanisms and group characteristics. 
 
More recent statistical-discrimination models have focused on differences in labor 
market experience other than wages.40  Bradford Cornell and Ivo Welch, for example, 
                                                                                                                         
659 (1972); Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor 
Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1977).  See also  Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job 
Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 
1972); Melvin Reder, Human Capital and Economic Discrimination, in HUMAN RESOURCES 
AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 71 (Ivar Berg ed., 1972); Glen G. Cain, The Economic Analysis of 
Labor Market Discrimination:  A Survey, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 693 (Orley 
Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986); Rein Haagsma, Statistical Discrimination and 
Competitive Signalling, 36 ECON.  LETTERS 93 (1991); Gerald S. Oettinger, Statistical 
Discrimination and the Early Career Evolution of the Black-White Wage Gap, 14 J. LAB. 
ECON. 52 (1996).  The Spring 1998 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives also contains 
a thoughtful set of papers.  See Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: 
 Beyond Market Interactions, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 117 (1998). 
38  In these models, this is true at least for candidates with test scores above a certain 
level. 
39  See A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) (the classic 
work on signaling in the labor market); see also A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 
(1974); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of 
Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283 (1975).  
40  For example, workers might encounter different hiring, promotion, or unemployment 
patterns.  Explanations for such differences may lie in different underlying quit rates.  See 
Michael Sattinger, Statistical Discrimination with Employment Criteria, 39 INT’L ECON. REV. 
205 (1998).  Differences may also lie in residence.  See Steven Raphael, 51 INDUS. LAB. REL. 
REV. 505 (1998).  Differences in job-market treatment may also result in disparate job-market 
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set up a model in which employers post fixed wages, then hire from a pool of 
applicants based on inferred ability.41  Here, employers screen applicants based on a 
variety of signals received.  If employers can more easily evaluate an applicant who 
resembles them -- in skin color, sex, religious beliefs, ethnicity, and so forth --
interviewing such a person gives employers more information than interviewing a 
person of a different race, sex, or background.  “Same-group” candidates therefore 
have a better chance of landing a job. 
 
The Cornell-Welch model, like the wage models, generates incentives for employers 
to devise lower-cost ways of learning about “other-group” candidates.  Moreover, as in 
wage models, “other-group” candidates have motives to acquire signals that convey 
information cheaply to prospective employers.  Significantly, the Cornell-Welch model 
also implies that, if employers could choose to evaluate workers on the job (via 
assessments that cost the same for each worker) rather than screen beforehand, 
screening discrimination could disappear.  But if a law were passed that made firing 
employees - particularly those in the “other group” - more expensive, employers would 
have to rely more on ex ante interviews than ex post evaluations of job performance.  
Passing such a law would therefore tend to increase employer rejection of 
“other-group” applicants. 
 
A plausible extension of the Cornell-Welch model could add the assumption that 
on-the-job evaluations cost more for “other-group” employees.  If so, employers would 
tend to screen out “other-group” applicants and fire “other-group” employees at a 
relatively higher rate -- not out of prejudice, but rather as a response to greater costs of 
assessment.  Once again, “other-group” individuals would have incentives to invest in 
signals to overcome the information problem.  Again, as well, a law that increased the 
price of firing employees would also increase the incidence of screening out 
“other-group” job candidates.  
 
2. The Typical After-Acquired Evidence Scenario:  The Plaintiff Sent a False 
Labor-Market Signal 
 
Signaling models offer a useful way to view after-acquired-evidence cases.  In 
such cases, after-acquired evidence indicates that a plaintiff misrepresented or 
concealed information from an employer.  The employer used the tainted 
information supplied by the plaintiff as a signal to indicate the suitability of including 
                                                                                                                         
participation.  For empirical measurement, see Marjorie Baldwin & William G. Johnson, 
Estimating the Employment Effects of Wage Discrimination, 74 REV. ECON. STAT . 446 (1992). 
41  Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination, 
104 J. POL. ECON. 542 (1996). 
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the person in a pool of prospective employees, matching the person with the job, 
or keeping the person employed. Like the wolf in sheep’s clothing, the plaintiff is 
not what he or she appeared. 
 
In some after-acquired-evidence cases, the plaintiff inflated the amount of 
human capital acquired, falsely claiming to have graduated from college (obtained a 
sheepskin, in other words) or gained previous on-the-job experience. Because 
investment in human capital yields an expected increase in job productivity, clear 
evidence of such investment -- like a baccalaureate degree or list of satisfied 
former employers -- cheaply communicates to a potential employer the ability to 
do a good job.42  Of course, these attributes also tend to raise wages.  Faking a 
degree or work experience, therefore, means sending a signal that the job applicant 
is more productive, and thus worth more, than he or she really is. 
 
  In other cases, the plaintiff concealed a defect in human capital by not 
reporting criminal convictions or terminations from previous jobs for fraud.  In 
these instances, the plaintiff deliberately obscured a signal that might have revealed 
his or her relative incompatibility with the job.43 
 
In a third set of cases, the employee committed an initially undiscovered act in 
the course of his or her current employment.  For instance, the worker may have 
falsified records or filched confidential files.  Such an act would signal the 
                                                 
42  For discussions of theory and empirical evidence on human capital and productivity, 
see GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3rd. ed. 1993).  See also  JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, 
EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS (1964); Dale T. Mortensen, Specific Capital and Labor Turnover, 
9 BELL J. ECON. 572 (1978); Boyan Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. POL. 
ECON. 1246 (1979); John Pencavel, Higher Education, Productivity, and Earnings, 22 J. ECON. 
EDUC. 331 (1991); W. Norton Grubb, The Varied Economic Returns to Post-Secondary 
Education:  New Evidence from the Class of 1972, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES  365 (1993); T. Paul 
Schultz, Investments in the Schooling and Health of Women and Men: Quantities and 
Returns, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES  694 (1993); Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 
Choosing Workers’ Qualifications: No Experience Necessary?, 34 INT’L. ECON. REV. 479 
(1993); Marc Fox, Is it a Good Investment to Attend an Elite Private College?, 12 ECON. 
EDUC. REV. 137 (1993); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Inequality and Relative Wages, 83 
AM. ECON. REV. 104 (1993); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Occupational Change and the 
Demand for Skill, 1940-1990, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 122 (1993); see generally JACOB MINCER, 
THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF JACOB MINCER (1993).  
43  This is not to say that all criminals are unsuitable for all jobs.  But people previously 
convicted for embezzlement may not be appropriate bank employees, and people jailed for 
assault might not be seemly hotel concierges. 
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employee’s dishonesty and unproductive attributes - if the employer only knew of 
it.44 
 
III.  DISSECTING MCKENNON: ITS STATED PURPOSE AND ITS UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES  
 
Discrimination statutes cover classes of qualified persons who possess some 
inborn trait: sex, race, age, and so forth.  Such laws aim to ensure that workers 
similarly situated with respect to productive characteristics will not encounter 
discrimination on the basis of immutable features irrelevant to job performance.  
Whether they achieve these aims is a matter of controversy - some scholars 
contend that discrimination laws actually are counterproductive or enforced so 
inappropriately that they do more harm than good.45  In part, these contentions 
arise because economic forces should typically make pure discrimination an 
unprofitable endeavor. 
 
However, suppose some pure discrimination exists in labor markets, perhaps 
because of market imperfections or because prejudiced supervisors depart from 
their employers’ profit-making objectives.  The rules laid out in McKennon are 
designed to reinforce discrimination statutes by punishing employers who act in a 
discriminatory fashion -- a laudable goal.  Yet McKennon may also generate 
serious consequences that the Supreme Court did not contemplate.  By doing 
violence to the labor-market signaling process, McKennon may ultimately harm the 
very people the Court intended to help.  
                                                 
44  Inappropriate behavior on the job is not the sort of signal that Spence discussed.  
Nevertheless, the logic of signaling easily ext ends to this situation. 
45  See James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment 
Discrimination Laws: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276 (1990); RICHARD 
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
(1992); Thomas G. Abram, The Law, Its Interpretation, Levels of Enforcement Activity, and 
Effect on Employer Behavior, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 62 (1993); Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing 
Employment Discrimination: From the Seminar Room to the Courtroom, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 
67 (1993); Robert S. Follett, et al., Problems in Assessing Employment Discrimination, 83 AM. 
ECON. REV. 73 (1993); James P. Smith, Affirmative Action and the Racial Wage Gap, 83 AM. 
ECON. REV. 79 (1993); Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, Antidiscrimination Enforcement and the 
Problem of Patronization, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, The Subtle Vices 
of the Employment Discrimination Laws, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 575 (1996).  
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A.  Discrimination Statutes, the Apparent Dilemma of a Summary Judgment 
Rule, and Administrative Costs 
 
Before McKennon, courts that ordered summary judgment for employer 
defendants typically relied on the argument that plaintiffs in after-acquired-evidence 
cases had no legal standing.  The argument went like this: Under discrimination 
statutes, someone with an enumerated trait is protected only insofar as he or she is 
a qualified person.  If workers gain or keep jobs under false pretenses, they are not 
qualified persons because they are not similarly situated with respect to productive 
characteristics.  A worker who falsely claims to have a master’s degree in 
engineering, for example, does not truly resemble a person who has the degree.  
The educational capital of the two differs and so may the trustworthiness.  Although 
the worker may have an immutable trait listed in discrimination statutes, he or she is 
not a member of the protected class and therefore cannot be a victim of 
discrimination under the statutes. 
 
Whereas this argument is logical and legally supportable, it seems to pose a 
dilemma:  we do not want to reward undeserving plaintiffs, yet nor do we wish to 
encourage discriminatory behavior by employers.  As one court put it: “[a ]false 
statement on an employment application is not be an insurance policy covering 
bigotry.”46  Suppose an employer fired someone with an immutable trait, unaware 
that the worker was actually an impostor.   Although after-acquired evidence 
reinforces the defendant’s action, the timing of the knowledge cannot rule out a 
discriminatory motive.  To critics of summary judgment, the rule therefore 
worsened labor market conditions for those whom discrimination statutes sought to 
protect.  Summary judgment cut off any plaintiff who had suffered discriminatory 
treatment, thus generating a type I error.47 
 
To be sure, a departure from summary judgment costs more to administer.  
Under McKennon, for example, employers will face more lawsuits and settle more 
cases with plaintiffs.  Not only will plaintiffs file more lawsuits, per-case 
                                                 
46  Bazzi v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1992), rev’d, 25 
F.3d. 1047 (6th Cir. 1994). 
47  A type I error occurs when someone rejects a hypothesis as false when it is actually 
true.  
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administrative costs may escalate because McKennon leaves many questions for 
individual courts to resolve.48  Further, because plaintiffs can potentially recover 
damages up to the time of discovery of incriminating evidence, they have clear 
financial incentives to protract the discovery process.  However, to opponents of 
summary judgment, this increased administrative burden simply reflects the cost our 
society should be willing to pay to deter pure discrimination by employers.  
 
2. Potential Failures of McKennon:  Higher Social Costs, More Discrimination, 
and Lower Investment by Minorities in Productive Capital 
 
Regrettably, added administrative costs are probably not the only outcome of 
McKennon.  The McKennon rule potentially creates significant other social costs 
as well.  It obscures the value of signals, causing employers to spend more on 
pre-employment screening and post-hire job evaluations.  Worst of all, it may 
actually increase the incidence of statistical discrimination, divert attention from 
purely prejudicial employer behavior, and discourage minorities from investing in 
human capital. 
 
1.  Fuzzy signals and the costs of McKennon to employers 
 
McKennon essentially reduces the costs to individuals of sending false signals in 
the labor market.  At the same time, it augments costs to employers of evaluating 
job applicants and existing employees.   
 
Suppose an individual falsely claims to have a college degree.  An employer 
who discovers the lie in the hiring process is economically justified in rejecting the 
applicant - because the person may not possess the human capital necessary to 
perform the job and may not be trustworthy.  If an employer learns of the lie after 
the applicant is hired but must still pay damages under McKennon, the penalties to 
applicants of sending a false signal are lower than under a summary judgment rule.  
Consequently, McKennon erodes the value of the educational signal itself.  
Cumbersome screening methods (and possibly poorer initial matches) will replace 
the substantial benefits of having an easily conveyed and trustworthy signal.49     
                                                 
48  One commentator has called for an even greater administrative role for courts in 
after-acquired-evidence cases than McKennon suggests, requesting that they use a 
comparative fault standard to arrive at damages.  Petersen, supra  note 24. 
49  For discussions of the benefits of good matches, see Robert E. Hall, Turnover in the 
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Certainly, one might argue that employers could help themselves in these cases 
simply by calling all schools and previous employers, or requiring the submission of 
transcripts or performance evaluations.  However, such measures take time and 
money, and documents are easily faked.  Perhaps more important, self-reported 
qualifications typically have served as an essential device for an employer to obtain 
a pool of eligible employees.  Yet employers simply cannot afford to rely on 
self-reporting under McKennon as much as they could under a summary judgment 
rule. 
 
Now suppose a defect in human capital goes unreported because the plaintiff 
neglects to report previous assault convictions on his or her job application.  The 
person is hired, then fired, allegedly for unruly behavior.  An employer might initially 
overrate the worker’s potential productivity on the job.  An employer-defendant 
could also suffer substantial additional economic loss if the plaintiff convinces a 
court of employer discrimination despite having concealed a shady past.  Under 
McKennon, the employer must design more costly mechanisms to check the fit 
between job and worker because the ruling makes a self-reported “clean-living” 
signal less reliable.50 
 
People send signals on the job that indicate their suitability, just as they do when 
applying for employment.  Indicators of a poor match, such as an employee’s 
falsification of records, are even stronger if they are artfully concealed.  Under 
McKennon, the value of apparent-good-behavior signals is smaller, productivity is 
relatively lower, and matches of workers to jobs are inferior.  Employers have 
incentives to increase surveillance of all employees.  At some point, workplace 
                                                                                                                         
Labor Force, 1972 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 709, and Boyan Jovanovic, Job 
Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972 (1979).  In more recent work, 
researchers have shown that government regulation of job creation and destruction impairs 
job-worker matching, leading to decreased average productivity and substantial welfare loss.  
Hugo Hopenhayn & Richard Rogerson, Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation:  A General 
Equilibrium Analysis, 101 J. POL. ECON. 915 (1993). 
50  The case of Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro , 35 Cal. 4th 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995), for example, barred any relief for plaintiffs who never would have been hired.  Here, the 
plaintiffs worked as legal secretaries.  On their job applications, they reported that they had 
never committed any felony.  In truth, they previously had been convicted of conspiring to 
defraud a bank.  McKennon opens the door for plaintiffs in cases like these to obtain some 
damages.  
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privacy issues could well conflict with employers’ need to guard against deceitful 
employees. 
 
2.  Fuzzy signals and the costs of McKennon to members of target groups. 
 
Employers generally face greater costs under McKennon than under a summary 
judgment rule, but why may members of target groups suffer?  In part, because 
everyone pays when signals lose clarity.  More to the point, fuzzy signals imply that 
employers may have to resort to supplemental group data on highly visible traits as 
they make hiring and other employment decisions.  By comparison to a summary 
judgment rule, the McKennon rule diminishes the value of signals.  This elevates the 
costs of acquiring information about prospective employees -- particularly those in 
the “other group ” -- and raises employers’ reliance (whether prejudicially 
motivated or not) on information associated with easily observable, immutable 
characteristics.  As the Cornell-Welch model makes clear, a law that increases the 
price of firing employees -- especially those in the “other group” -- may mean that 
employers simply screen out “other-group” candidates.  By attempting to eliminate 
true discrimination, the McKennon decision thus makes statistical discrimination 
more likely.  In fact, members of target groups may never even have a chance to 
be plaintiffs.  Employers could simply choose to locate in places where few 
individuals with protected traits reside in order to fend off discrimination-in-hiring 
charges.51 
 
When “other-group” candidates are hired, McKennon is far likelier to generate 
type II errors -- rewarding false claims -- than to reduce type I errors.52  Why?  
McKennon came before the Court on the express assumption that discrimination 
was the sole basis for termination.  But this overlooks something critical.  The 
McKennon court stated that “[t]he employer could not have been motivated by 
                                                 
51  For discussion, see Abram, supra  note 45, at 62; Coate & Loury, supra  note 45, at 92.  
For many reasons, the United States already has a spatial mismatch between jobs and 
potential workers.  See Stephen L. Ross, Racial Differences in Residential and Job Mobility: 
Evidence Concerning the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, 43 J. URB. ECON. 112 (1998); Wayne 
Vroman, Industrial Change and Black Men’s Relative Earnings, in 12 RESEARCH IN LABOR 
ECONOMICS (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed. 1991).  
52  A type II error occurs when someone accepts a hypothesis as true even though it is 
actually false. 
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knowledge it did not have.”53  True, but the after-acquired evidence obtained in 
many cases gave considerable weight to the employer’s original rationale for firing 
(or not hiring) the plaintiff.  Plaintiffs who falsely claimed to have college degrees or 
relevant work experience frequently were dismissed for poor performance, 
according to defendants.54  The defendants’ claims seem plausible if the level of 
education and the presence of previous jobs are positively correlated with 
subsequent work performance.  Other plaintiffs who were discharged for poor 
performance had in fact stolen money or confidential materials from employers, 
cheated employers, came to work impaired, or lied about their physical health.55  
Again, the defendant’s feelings about the quality of the plaintiff’s contributions to 
                                                 
53  McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995).  One issue in 
after-acquired-evidence cases is their resemblance to mixed-motive cases.  If a worker is fired 
for two reasons --  one discriminatory and one not -- the employer can avoid liability if he 
would have taken the same action absent the discriminatory reason.  The problem with 
applying the mixed-motive reasoning directly to after-acquired-evidence cases is that the 
employer did not have the damning evidence at the time of making the employment decision -- 
he obtained it only during discovery.  See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 US 274 (1977), 670 F.2d 59 (6th Cir 1982); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US 228 
(1989), aff’d, 920 F.2d 967 (1990); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., 31 F. 3d 1221 (3rd 
Cir. 1994); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation:  The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed 
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1991); Heather K. 
Gerken, Note, Understanding Mixed Motive Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991:  An 
Analysis of International Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1824 (1993). 
54  See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); Bonger v. 
Am. Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 
F.3d 1221 (3rd Cir. 1994); Cooper v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972; 
Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995); Petrovich v. LPI Serv. Corp., 949 F. 
Supp. 626 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Barlow v. Hester Indus. Inc., 479 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1996).  
55  See Summers v. State Farm, 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir 1988); Paglio v. Chagrin Valley 
Hunt Club Corp., No. 91-3983, 1992 WL144674 (6th Cir 1992); O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas 
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 79 F.3d 756 (9th 
Cir.1996); Dotson v. U.S. Postal Service, 961 F.2d 1576 (6th Cir. 1992); Greene v. Standard 
Register Co. 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1151 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Walters v. U.S. Gypsum, 
537 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1995); Sigmon v. Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), Toyota v. Epperson, 945 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1996); Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 
F.3d 457 (2d Cir. (N.Y. 1996); Gassman v. Evangelical Luth. Good Sam. Soc., 921 P.2d 224 
(Colo. 1996).  A related case is Carlson v. WPLGTV-IO, Post-Newsweek Stations, 956 F. Supp. 
994 (S.D. Fla. 1996).  See also  Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure-to-hire 
case).  
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the job related believably to actual quality.  Still other plaintiffs who were fired for 
insubordination, marginal job performance, or unpalatable behavior had actually 
committed reprehensible acts in the past.56  If those who misbehaved in the past 
are more likely to misbehave in the future, the claims of employer-defendants seem 
to have merit.  In sum, although pure discrimination may have transpired in some 
after-acquired-evidence cases, the facts frequently indicate otherwise. 
 
Consequently, McKennon may well spawn disputes that draw attention away 
from pure discrimination in the workplace.  By de-emphasizing the plaintiff’s status, 
McKennon means that members of protected classes will find their educational 
degrees demeaned, their clean criminal records less noteworthy, and their 
exemplary work performance less valuable.  Those who expected to stand proudly 
by their accomplishments -- and use these to buttress claims of unfair or prejudicial 
treatment -- are lumped together with everyone of the same race, sex, religion, or 
other common trait.  Put simply, those who truly encounter discrimination on the 
job may get lost in the shuffle.  Let me explain:  the more we can isolate an 
immutable trait as the only difference between a plaintiff and other workers, the 
more we might point to pure discrimination on the part of the employer or the 
employer’s representatives.  McKennon muddies the process.  Of course, honest 
plaintiffs who suffer pure discrimination theoretically would obtain greater damages 
than McKennon-type plaintiffs because they would be more likely to qualify for 
front pay and reinstatement.  But the reality is that resources are scarce and life is 
uncertain:  under McKennon, honest people may find it as difficult to distinguish 
themselves in a courtroom as they do in a job interview.  This is especially true 
because discovery that would flush out a dishonest plaintiff is costly under 
McKennon and the EEOC guidelines:  the sanctions on employers for abusive 
discovery may over-deter them from engaging in any meaningful discovery.  One 
plausible result is an increase in the number of settlements, with settlement amounts 
                                                 
56  See Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Wallace 
v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); Milligan-Jensen v. Mich. Tech. 
Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 509 U.S. 903 (1992), cert. dismissed, 509 U.S. 
943 (1993); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F. 2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Wright v. Restaurant, 
532 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Patterson v. PHP Healthcare, 90 F. 3d.927 (5th Cir. 
1996); Crawford Rehab. Serv. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997); Lewis v. Fisher Service 
Co., 495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998); Mathis v. Boeing, 719 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989); see 
also  Kravit v. Delta Air Lines, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (failure to 
hire).    
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failing to distinguish between honest and dishonest plaintiffs and failing to separate 
prejudiced from unprejudiced defendants. 
 
What might be the ultimate consequence of McKennon?  Besides an increased 
incidence of pre-hire screening by employers, McKennon creates disincentives to 
invest in signals, particularly for those with protected traits.  Because McKennon 
reduces the informational content of signals, people with traits enumerated in 
discrimination statutes simply may not find it as worthwhile to acquire costly human 
capital or other sorts of indicators of productivity.  To the extent members of 
protected classes -- particularly minorities -- historically have invested less in 
education, training, and other forms of human capital, a legal rule that grants relief 
to dishonest plaintiffs may well widen the skills gap.57 
 
Not incidentally, the strain on court resources imposed by McKennon -- 
particularly if courts extend the McKennon reasoning to simple breach-of-contract 
cases -- aggravates an already troubling trend. Civil rights litigation has expanded 
far more rapidly over the last three decades than other forms of litigation because 
legislatures have added types of protected classes, the EEOC has expanded its 
jurisdiction, and judges have accepted new theories of liability.  As some worried 
commentators point out, these expansions mean that people focus far less on the 
original target group -- African-Americans.  At the same time, the gains of this 
group have slowed considerably.58 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
College degrees, relevant previous experience, spotless criminal records, and 
evidence of good work performance all send signals to employers that prospective 
and chosen employees will fit their jobs well.  These labor market signals thus 
perform an economic function by saving on information costs.  Integrity of such 
signals means good matches between workers and jobs, low turnover, high returns 
to investments in human capital, and a productive economy.  These in turn yield 
                                                 
57  Younger well-educated blacks of both sexes and black female college graduates earned 
a lower premium for education even before McKennon.  David Card & Thomas Lemieux, Wage 
Dispersion, Returns to Skill, and Black-White Wage Differentials, 74 J. ECONOMETRICS 319, 
321 (1996); see also  June O’Neill, The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences 
Between Black and White Men, 4 J. ECON. PERSPS. 25 (1990). 
58  See Abram, supra  note 45, at 62; Smith, supra  note 45, at 79. 
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lower costs of doing business, which benefits workers and consumers as well as 
employers.  Sound signals also reduce employers’ use of immutable characteristics 
as indicators of productivity, thus decreasing the likelihood of statistical 
discrimination.  In a world of clear signals, courts could therefore focus on ferreting 
out cases of true workplace prejudice. 
 
The McKennon court intended to discourage discriminatory behavior by 
employers.  Yet, by providing redress to plaintiffs with no real legal standing, it also 
reduced the usefulness of job market signals.  One of the most disturbing aspects 
of the ruling is that members of protected classes will potentially suffer.  Increases 
in pre-hire screening may make finding jobs harder for minorities.  Those who are 
hired may find that proving subtle cases of prejudice has become more difficult.  
An individual with a protected trait could point to legitimate qualifications and good 
job performance to support a claim of employer discrimination if signals were 
reliable; not so when signals lose their shine.  As a result, people with protected 
traits may have less incentive to invest in human capital and to act productively on 
the job.  This in turn could exacerbate existing discrepancies in marketable skills 
across different groups in the population.  
 
The fallout from McKennon is still in progress. Because of the remedial leeway 
left by the McKennon court, the effect on the signaling process is as yet impossible 
to ascertain empirically.  Many law review articles have called for applications of 
McKennon that will enhance plaintiff awards, whereas trial courts generally have 
squelched equitable relief in cases of severe misconduct.57  The net impact of 
McKennon will clearly turn upon the way courts tend to apply the ruling.  
 
One last point: the economic boom enjoyed in the U.S. since the McKennon 
ruling has probably meant that at least some rejected job applicants and fired 
workers have gotten new jobs and gone on with their lives rather than filed lawsuits 
claiming discrimination.  Watching what happens when the economy turns 
downward will likely enlighten us as to the true implications of McKennon. 
                                                 
1.  
                                                 
57  See Stark & Sande, supra  note 24, at 30. 
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